The cancellation of government talks between the two Koreas due to a disagreement on the status of the chief delegate has triggered various observations and scenarios concerning the latest disappointment.

Above all, everyone seems to wonder what suspended the inter-Korean meeting, which was virtually all set to go, on the eve of the event. From start to finish, Cheong Wa Dae lies at the center of the story.

It was Cheong Wa Dae's decision to "raise" the level of the talks to a ministerial level when the related ministry thought otherwise, and it was also Cheong Wa Dae which insisted on matching the "level" of the chief delegate and specifically requested for Kim Yang-gon, the Director of the United Front Department of the Workers' Party of Korea.

It appears the government had already known that Pyongyang was going to send the director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea during the preparatory meeting.

North Korea's counter proposal for working-level talks, the tug-of-war between the two Koreas concerning the location of the preparatory talks (Kaesong vs. Panmunjom), and the arduous discussions on June 9 which continued until the early hours of the next day: these details and the background of how the talks were scrapped are slowly revealing themselves.

* Cheong Wa Dae led the talks including the decision for "ministerial talks"

It was Cheong Wa Dae, which originally suggested holding "ministerial talks" for the inter-governmental negotiation. One official familiar with the talks said, "The South Korean government considered vice minister-level talks at the most when North Korea expressed their intention to engage in government talks [on June 6], but Cheong Wa Dae ordered ministerial talks."

This is when the government started to claim that due to the comprehensive agenda proposed by the North, a high-level official who can take on the responsibility and handle the issues should attend the meeting.

The following day, the South Korean government sent a message changing the location of the preparatory talks to Panmunjom instead of Kaesong, proposed by the North. The message was sent in the name of unification minister Ryoo Kihl-jae and addressed to Director Kim--an extended effort to "level" the status of the two figures.

During the preliminary talks, the South Korean delegation suggested that Kim attend the meeting as a way to resolve an issue he caused, since North Korea announced its plans to withdraw all its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Park right after Kim visited the industrial site on March 8. The North's chief delegate, Kim Song-hye listened to the South's argument and returned, but later expressed anger and demanded the South to "immediately apologize."

The Ministry of Unification has long wanted to level the class of the two organizations overseeing inter-Korean policies in the Korean peninsula: the Ministry of Unification and the United Front Department.

A South Korean government official said, "In the past, we called them ministerial talks, but in fact, North Korea's delegation was headed by a cabinet official. In reality, they were lower-level officials who only held titles with no discretionary power. So within the unification ministry, there has always been a demand to level the position of the chief delegates in inter-Korean talks."

* The true intention hidden behind the renaming of the talks to "government talks"

In the midst of such disagreement between the two Koreas, they still agreed to rename the talks, "government talks." They replaced the name "ministerial talks," which specifically states the position of the chief delegate, with a more ambiguous term, changing the nature of the meeting. Behind this change lie the different intentions of Seoul and Pyongyang.

For the South, the status of the chief delegate was a problem. A unification ministry official said, "We suggested renaming the talks to senior-level government talks, if a minister-level figure could not attend the meeting, but North Korea refused this as well." It was difficult to find grounds to call the meeting a ministerial talk, since a meeting between Ryoo Kihl-jae and Kim Yang-gon was out of the question.

As we can see in the South Korean government's explanation that North Korea first suggested renaming the ministerial talks, North Korea must have felt the same. An official concerned with the talks said, "North Korea had been reluctant in calling the meeting ministerial talks or high-level talks.

North Korea wants to resolve inter-Korean issues through an economic and social approach, and they seemed uncomfortable because if the level of the delegate is 'raised,' political and military issues will inevitably come up." This supports claims that North Korea did not welcome high-level talks from the start, for they could highlight its "nuclear issue."

* South Korea expected the North to send Kang Ji-yong

North Korea had practically informed the South that their delegation would be headed by Kang Ji-yong, Director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, during the preparatory meeting.

A Cheong Wa Dae official said, "Originally, we had wanted a meeting between Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae and Director Kim Yang-gon of the United Front Department, but from the start, North Korea said they could not send Kim Yang-gon. It appears they didn't stop at just saying no; they said they would send a director of the committee's secretariat."

Accordingly, the unification ministry expected the North to send Director Kang as their chief delegate, if a meeting between Ryoo Kihl-jae and Kim Yang-gon was not possible. That is why Seoul chose Kim Nam-sik, Vice Minister of Unification as its chief delegate, even before they confirmed the North's delegation. The unification ministry official said, "We expected the North to send Director Kang after the preliminary talks. And we informed them that we would send a figure on par with their chief delegate."

In fact, there were also positive views within the unification ministry that Director Kang as the North's chief delegate would be a favorable partner for a vice minister. Some [officials] even said the North "showed some sincerity" compared to the chief delegates they had sent as the counterpart for South Korea's ministers in previous ministerial talks.

* The talks were already broken off the moment the Koreas exchanged the list of their delegations

The unification ministry had practically deemed the talks canceled at 1 p.m. on June 11, shortly after the two Koreas exchanged the list of delegates. The South Korean government listed Vice Minister Kim Nam-sik as the chief delegate expecting North Korea's delegation to be headed by Director Kang Ji-yong. They expected it would be unlikely for North Korea to accept this, since they claimed that Director Kang was a minister-level figure.

"North Korea almost immediately raised an issue after receiving the South's list, and said they would hold off sending their delegation," one source relayed. Afterwards, the South sternly demanded the North to level the "class" of the chief delegate during several discussions through the liaison officer, which lasted until 7:05 p.m.

The unification ministry official said, "North Korea continued to ask why we were sending a vice minister, but we explained that under the current situation, a vice minister was the most appropriate as the senior representative." The two Koreas ran a parallel course and eventually North Korea considered this a "serious provocation" and decided to postpone sending their delegation.